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INTRODUCTION
The objective of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
(MERA)l is to provide "an adequate civil remedy to protect air,
water, land and other natural resources located within the state from
pollution, impairment, or destruction." 2 The term "natural re-
sources" includes "scenic and aesthetic resources ... owned by any
governmental unit or agency. "3 Since its enactment in 1971, MERA
has been used effectively to prevent the pollution, impairment, and
destruction of a variety of Minnesota's natural resources.
4
1. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01-.13 (1990). The Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act was signed into law by Governor Wendell Anderson on June 7, 1971.
2. Id. § 116B.01 (Purpose). Section 116B.01 states:
The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by right to the
protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other
natural resources located within the state and that each person has the re-
sponsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and enhancement
thereof. The legislature further declares its policy to create and maintain
within the state conditions under which human beings and nature can exist
in productive harmony in order that present and future generations may
enjoy clean air and water, productive land, and other natural resources with
which this state has been endowed.
Id.
3. Id. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (Definitions): "'Natural resources shall include, but not
be limited to, all mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude,
recreational and historical resources. Scenic and aesthetic resources shall also be
considered natural resources when owned by any governmental unit or agency."
4. See, e.g., Powderly v. Erickson, 301 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1981) (applying
MERA to prevent, for a time, the demolition of historic row houses in Red Wing);
People for Envtl. Enlightenment & Responsibility (PEER), Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl.
Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978) (applying MERA to block a segment
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MERA's "scenic and aesthetic" provision is a potentially invalua-
ble tool for the protection of Minnesota's unique environmental re-
sources from external threats. 5 However, few cases have been
initiated under MERA asserting protection of scenic and aesthetic
resources. 6 To date, Minnesota court decisions have developed no
of proposed route of high voltage transmission line on grounds that transmission
line would pollute lake and woods and that feasible and prudent alternative existed);
Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257
N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977) (applying MERA to block club's operation of outdoor trap-
and-skeet shooting facility on ground of impairment of quietude); County of Free-
born v. Bryson, 309 Minn. 178, 243 N.W.2d 316 (1976) (applying MERA to block
condemnation proceedings by county for proposed highway through farmland on
ground that proposed highway would materially adversely affect natural wildlife
marsh); In re Central Baptist Theological Seminary, 370 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (applying MERA to block construction of radio tower in public wetland on
ground that tower would be detrimental to wildlife habitat); In re Cron, No. 18451
(Dist. Ct. St. Louis County, Minn. July 27, 1976) (applying MERA in part to enjoin
riparian landowner from constructing boathouse on grounds that the boathouse
would have a material adverse effect on the aesthetic beauty of the lake and that
feasible and prudent alternative existed); McBurney v. Loris, No. 14411 (Dist. Ct.
Carver County, Minn. June 27, 1975) (applying MERA to force horse stable owner to
minimize drainage of horse manure which contributed to algal growth in lake); Bry-
den, Environmental Rights in Theoy and Practice, 62 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Bryden, Environmental Rights] (exploring the genealogy of environmental rights
statutes, including MERA and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, and sur-
veying the first five years of litigation under MERA).
5. "External threats" are activities and phenomena which take place outside the
boundaries of an area but nonetheless have a significant impact on the "integrity" of
the area. An example of how an external activity may violate the integrity of a site is
found in Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battkfield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct.
231, 302 A.2d 886 (1973). In Gettysburg, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court al-
lowed the construction of a 307-foot observation tower on land near the National
Gettysburg National Military Park and Cemetery over the objection of the Common-
wealth that the tower's looming presence would be inappropriate. The Gettysburg
court espoused the right to use one's property as one pleases in the absence of un-
reasonable interference with a neighbor's use and enjoyment of his property. This
attitude, however well established in the annals of American law, may require modifi-
cation in cases where unique environmental resources are at issue in order to ade-
quately protect such resources. See also OUR COMMON LANDS (D. Simon ed. 1988) (a
collection of essays by leading environmental specialists expressing the common
theme that much of the nation's wilderness areas face major threats arising from ac-
tivity beyond their borders); Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the External
Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1985) (discussing whether and how
Congress should protect the nation's parks from activity on lands adjacent to parks
which could cause significant damage, including aesthetic damage, to park
resources).
6. Only three of over 30 cases in which MERA has been employed have men-
tioned the scenic and aesthetic provision. Of these three, only one has focused more
than incidentally on the provision. See State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, Apr. 25, 1990 (discussed infra notes 85-106 and
accompanying text); Kasden v. Independent School Dist. No. 97, No. C7-88-1597
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1989) (unpublished opinion) (discussed infra text accompa-
1991]
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formal standards to determine what is protectable under MERA's
scenic and aesthetic provision.
In State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz,7 the Minnesota Court of Appeals
decided that MERA precluded the construction of a radio tower on
privately-owned land near the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in
Northern Minnesota. In holding that the construction of the radio
tower would "materially adversely affect" protected scenic and aes-
thetic resources, the court failed to articulate authoritative criteria
for the evaluation of scenic and aesthetic resources. As the provision
now stands, a private landowner cannot reasonably determine what
conduct is actionable. MERA's scenic and aesthetic provision re-
mains open to future challenges based on unconstitutional
vagueness.8
This Note first discusses the history and purpose of MERA in light
of the problems faced by plaintiffs in environmental actions at com-
mon law. Next, this Note explores MERA's unique provisions and
illustrates MERA's effect on common law obstacles generally en-
countered in traditional natural resource litigation. Third, this Note
discusses the Martz decision and identifies problems that arise from
the protection of a scenic or aesthetic resource. This Note concludes
by describing a method for evaluating scenic and aesthetic resource
issues that should withstand attacks of unconstitutional vagueness
and continue to serve the purpose of protecting Minnesota's envi-
ronmental resources.
I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF MERA
A. Defending the Environment: Common Law Obstacles
The area of environmental law developed in the 1960s in response
nying notes 119-22); In re Cron, No. 18451 (Dist. Ct. St. Louis County, Minn. July 27,
1976) (Although the court's decision suggested a reliance on MERA, the DNR ar-
gued MERA was not necessary to the decision as the DNR had a policy of prohibiting
construction of boathouses which antedated MERA.).
7. 451 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, Apr. 25, 1990. In
Drabik, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that MERA may be used to block
external activities which have an adverse effect on Minnesota's scenic or aesthetic
resources. Id. at 897. The decision does not, however, explain how one identifies
threats to such resources or how one identifies such resources.
8. See, e.g., Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (A law is uncon-
stitutionally vague if "it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or
leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without legally fixed standards, what is pro-
hibited and what is not in each particular case."); Ziegler, Aesthetics in Ohio Land Use
Law: Preserving Beauty in the Parlor and Keeping Pigs in the Barnyard, 19 AKRON L. REV. 1,
24 (1985) [hereinafter Zeigler, Ohio Land Use Law] (Any regulation which relies on
visual beauty "creates the impossible task of satisfying the vagueness due process
requirement of setting forth intelligible standards for the implementation and admin-
istration of aesthetic regulation .... ").
[Vol. 171192
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to citizen concern for the preservation of the environment.9 By the
late 1960s, it was clear that existing administrative and common law
environmental protection mechanisms were inadequate to protect
the environment. Legal scholars argued that by modifying existing
legal doctrines, citizens could provide an important and effective
supplement to governmental action for environmental protection.10
Foremost among these scholars was Professor Joseph Sax, who
published Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action in
1971.11 In Defending the Environment, Sax concluded that the power of
the judiciary should be increased in environmental disputes to allow
citizens, through litigation, to play a greater role in environmental
protection. 2
Sax's conclusion was based on two criticisms of the then-existing
environmental protection system. First, Sax stated that the then-cur-
rent system for resolving environmental disputes was enmeshed in
the political and practical quagmire of the bureaucratic process. The
highly political nature of administrative agencies made it difficult for
the bureaucrat, let alone the private citizen, to advance and resolve
environmental concerns through administrative channels.13 Further,
"red tape" involved in the administrative process could convince a
concerned party that the measures necessary for success were not
worth the effort. 14
Second, to preserve their political capital, bureaucrats and agen-
cies often put their self-interest ahead of environmental quality. For
this reason, Sax argued the then-existing practice of relying solely on
administrative regulation would likely result in the "insidious, cumu-
lative degradation of the environment."15 "It is much easier [for the
9. See, e.g., Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAw AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 105 (1970).
10. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 163. Commentators theorized
that if private citizens were able to litigate their environmental concerns, the courts,
in conjunction with interested private citizens, could play a meaningful and useful
role in shaping environmental policy. Id.
11. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
(1971) [hereinafter DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT]. Sax, at the time his book was
published, was a professor of law at the University of Michigan. Sax is also the author
of the Model Environmental Protection Act (Model Act) which was adopted by the
Michigan Legislature in 1969 as the Michigan Environmental Rights Act (MEPA). See
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (West Supp. 1977). For the text of the
Model Act, see the appendix to DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 247-52.
12. DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 56.
13. Id. at 108.
14. Id. at 110.
15. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 170. This cumulative degrada-
tion is also known as the "nibbling phenomenon" where "large resource values are
gradually eroded, case by case, as one development after another is allowed." DE-
FENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 55.
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government bureaucrat] to tell a developer that he cannot dam up
the Grand Canyon than to tell each real estate investor, one by one
over time, that he cannot fill an acre or two of marshy 'waste
land.' "16
Sax reasoned that, with necessary modifications, the judicial pro-
cess would allow private citizens to do more than merely participate
in an agency hearing. Private citizens would have the opportunity to
initiate actions to protect the environment. Sax's premise in Defend-
ing the Environment was that private citizens and special interest
groups are better suited to the pursuit of "good" environmental pol-
icy through litigation than are government bureaucrats through
agency administration. "[T]he fact is that the citizen does not need a
bureaucratic middleman to identify, prosecute, and vindicate his in-
terest in environmental quality. He is perfectly capable of fighting
his own battles-if only he is given the tools with which to do the
job."t7
With the right tools, the citizen could bring an environmental con-
cern to the branch of government least likely to be infected by the
"disease" of politics, the courts.18 When compared with administra-
tive agencies, the courts are "outsiders." Courts are less amenable
to political pressure than administrative agencies and the judicial
process inherently presents less "red tape" than the bureaucratic
process.19 Because no judge is likely to deal exclusively with envi-
ronmental cases, there is far less pressure than in the bureaucratic
process to strike some balance between the various parties involved
in such cases. By possessing the uninhibited power to enjoin
"projects that lack specific legislative authorization and that have
substantial and often irreversible environmental consequences, the
courts can achieve a sort of 'legislative remand,' . . . forcing the de-
fendants to seek 'some form of genuine public assent' . ".. 20
In 1969, a bill was introduced to the Minnesota Legislature that
was very similar to the Model Environmental Protection Act offered
by Sax in Defending the Environment.2 1 The version of MERA that
16. DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 56.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 82. The selection of agency bureaucrats who deal with environmental
matters is based partly on the reaction of pressure groups towards political candi-
dates. This is generally not the case with the selection ofjudges. Further, judges and
the courts are, by design, immune to political pressure. See generally Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473
(1970).
19. DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 108.
20. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 172-73 (citations omitted).
21. Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575, 577 (1972)
(discussing enactment of the MERA in 1971). This environmental bill was intro-
duced too late in the 1969 legislative session to be considered. In fact, very few
[Vol. 171194
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eventually became law went through more than a dozen drafts and
weathered a number of major controversies.2 2 However, the final
version of MERA embodied all of what Sax hoped to accomplish with
the Model Act.
Before MERA was enacted there were few common law remedies
available to private citizens fighting pollution. The common law en-
forced strict standing requirements for private individuals and orga-
nizations wishing to sue federal or local governments in connection
with environmental damage. 23 If standing was found, a court typi-
cally gave great deference to the federal and local governmental
decisionmaking process. This deference was embodied in the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule which applied only a minimum rationality test
to the governmental action.
24
Common law remedies were aimed primarily at protecting individ-
ual property interests. 25 Nuisance law served as the most useful
cause of action for landowners with environmental concerns.
26
Under nuisance law, a plaintiff was required to show a specific injury,
legislators were informed about the concept of such legislation at the time. In addi-
tion, although then-state senator Anderson had made pollution and environmental
protection part of his 1970 gubernatorial campaign, he did not actively support the
citizen suit bills during the 1971 legislative session. Id.
22. Id. at 578. One of the biggest controversies was whether a provision for com-
pensatory damages should be included in MERA. For a number of reasons, it was
determined that such a provision should not be included. First, the drafters feared
that a damages provision would make MERA appear too strong and diminish its
chances for being passed. Second, the drafters did not want to provide judges with
an excuse to refuse equitable relief and instead provide mere monetary damages.
23. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 166; Sive, Some Thoughts of an
Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612
(1970) [hereinafter Sive, Some Thoughts].
24. Under the substantial evidence rule, a court must affirm a governmental de-
partment or agency factual finding so long as it is supported by some rational basis.
See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (Court must affirm
factual finding of administrative body when finding is supported by "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.");
Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 165; Sive, Some Thoughts, supra note 23, at
617.
25. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 166.
26. See id.; Note, supra note 21.
Another common law cause of action which may be employed in environmental
cases is the tort of trespass. A trespass is an actionable invasion of a possessor's
interest in the exclusive possession of land. Under a trespass cause of action, a plain-
tiff is entitled to relief upon showing an intentional, unprivileged physical intrusion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1979). Yet, trespass is not usually helpful in
environmental disputes because most courts require an actual physical intrusion
before a trespass will be recognized. Therefore, courts rarely permit such actions in
air pollution cases. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 166, citing Note, The
Viability of Common Law Actions for Pollution Caused Injuries and Proof of Facts, 18 N.Y.L.F.
935, 958 (1973).
1991]
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an interference with the quiet use and enjoyment of some proprie-
tary interest.27 However, the nuisance cause of action was problem-
atic because, when the environmental damage affected a larger area,
the plaintiff was required to show that his injury differed " 'not only
in degree but in kind' from the injury to other citizens."28 For this
reason, a plaintiff with ideological concerns about environmental
damage was rarely successful at obtaining relief.
Once in court, a plaintiff had to contend with extremely difficult
burden of proof requirements. In environmental disputes, factual is-
sues are often so complex and speculative that the party with the
burden of proof cannot meet the required legal burden. Consider,
for example, the difficulty of proving, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that horse manure entering a tributary creek several miles up-
stream from a lake is the cause of severe detrimental algal growth in
that lake.29 These obstacles often prevented plaintiffs and organiza-
tions from successfully challenging polluters under the common law.
B. MERA's Modification of the Common Law
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act removes the standing
and burden of proof obstacles presented by the common law. The
removal of these obstacles allows private citizens effectively to con-
front environmental degradation. MERA extends the right to initiate
actions to "[any person residing within the state; the attorney gen-
eral; any political subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or
agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof; or any part-
nership, corporation, association, organization, or other entity hav-
ing shareholders, members, partners or employees residing within
the state . . . ."3o These persons or entities may enforce existing
environmental quality standards, 31 enjoin conduct that "materially
adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the environ-
ment,"3 2 intervene in or compel judicial review of administrative
27. See Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 166; see generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
28. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 166 (citations omitted); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
29. See McBurney v. Loris, No. 14411 (Dist. Ct. Carver County, Minn. June 27,
1975).
30. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (1990) (Civil Actions).
31. Id. § 116B.03, subd. 1. See id. § 116B.02, subd. 5: "'Pollution, impairment
or destruction' is any conduct by any person which violates, or is likely to violate, any
environmental quality standard, limitation, regulation, rule, order, license, stipula-
tion agreement, or permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political
subdivision thereof ...."
32. Id. § 1 16B.02, subd. 5. However, the mere introduction of an odor into the
air does not alone constitute pollution. Id.
1196 [Vol. 17
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proceedings concerning the environment,33 or challenge state envi-
ronmental standards or actions.3 4
MERA changes the burden of proof, requiring that the plaintiff
make only a prima facie case of pollution, impairment or destruction.
A prima facie case is made by showing that a protectable natural re-
source is at issue and that the defendant's conduct results, or is likely
to result, in the pollution, impairment or destruction of that re-
source. The burden is then on the defendant to rebut the prima fa-
cie showing.35
33. Section 116B.09 states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 10 of this act, in any admin-
istrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding, and in any action forjudicial
review thereof which is made available by law, any natural person residing
within the state, the attorney general, any political subdivision of the state,
any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision
thereof, or any partnership, corporation, association, organization or other
legal entity having shareholders, members, partners, or employees residing
within the state shall be permitted to intervene as a party upon the filing of a
verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review
involves conduct that has caused or is likely to cause pollution, impairment,
or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources located
within the state.
(2) In any such administrative, licensing, or other similar proceedings,
the agency shall consider the alleged impairment, pollution, or destruction
of the air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the state
and no conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, or is likely to
have such effect so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consis-
tent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and wel-
fare and the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air, water,
land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion. Economic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct.
(3) In any action for judicial review of any administrative, licensing, or
other similar proceeding as described in subdivision 1, the court shall, in
addition to any other duties imposed upon it by law, grant review of claims
that the conduct caused, or is likely to cause pollution, impairment, or de-
struction of the air, water, land, or other natural resources located within
the state, and in granting such review it shall act in accordance with the
provisions of sections 116B.01 to 116B.13 and the administrative proce-
dures act.
Id. § 1 16B.09 (Intervention; Judicial review).
34. See id. § 116B.10 (Reviewal of State Actions).
35. See id. § 116B.04 (Burden of Proof). This section states in part:
In any action maintained under section 116B.03, . . . whenever the
plaintiff shall have made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the de-
fendant violates or is likely to violate [an] environmental quality standard,
limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit, the defend-
ant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the
contrary; provided, however, that where the... regulations . . . of two or
more of the aforementioned agencies are inconsistent, the most stringent
shall control.
[W]henever the plaintiff shall have made a prima facie showing that the
conduct of the defendant has, or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment,
or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources located
within the state, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the
submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, by
1991] 1197
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Unlike nuisance law, MERA does not require the plaintiff to show
that a defendant's conduct is unreasonable. Reasonable conduct is
considered an affirmative defense under MERA. To use this defense,
a defendant must show that there is no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive and that the conduct at issue is consistent with and reasonably
required for "promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in
light of the state's paramount concern for the protection of its air,
water, land and other natural resources from pollution, impairment,
or destruction. Economic considerations alone are not sufficient." 3 6
The first case involving MERA to reach the Minnesota Supreme
Court was County of Freeborn v. Btyson.S7 William and Arlene Bryson
initiated this action in response to condemnation proceedings
brought by Freeborn County. Land owned by the Brysons was con-
demned for construction of a new county highway. The Brysons as-
serted that the construction of the highway would destroy marshland
on their property which supported a substantial wildlife popula-
tion.38 The Brysons argued that, under MERA, even governmental
condemnation of land was prohibited if the condemnation resulted
in the destruction of wildlife and if the government failed to show
that no feasible and prudent alternative existed.39 The County ar-
gued that the application of MERA was limited by the County's
power to condemn land for public use and that any alternative routes
for the highway were less safe and more expensive than the pro-
posed route.40 The Bryson court held that MERA was not limited by
the County's power of eminent domain4l and that affordable and
safe alternatives were available to the County that would avoid im-
pairment and destruction of the marshland.42
way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive and the conduct at issue is consistent with and reasonably required for
promotion of the public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's
paramount concern for the protection of its air, water, land and other natu-
ral resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. Economic consid-
erations alone shall not constitute a defense hereunder.
Id.
36. Id. By making reasonableness an affirmative defense, MERA relieves plain-
tiffs of the burden of showing that the defendant's conduct is unreasonable.
37. 297 Minn. 218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973), rev'd, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976).
38. Id. at 220, 210 N.W.2d at 293. The area consisted of approximately 7.5 acres
of natural marsh with three open water ponds. The marsh contained abundant plant
and animal life. The area was developed by the owners "as a wildlife habitat through
fir tree plantings, excavation of the open water ponds and maintenance of a 1-acre
unharvested food plot for wildlife." Id.
39. Id. at 219-20, 210 N.W.2d at 292.
40. Id. at 220-21, 210 N.W.2d at 293. To avoid the marshland, the County would
have to put curves in the proposed highway, a maneuver which allegedly would make
the highway more dangerous and more expensive to construct. Id.
41. Id. at 227, 210 N.W.2d at 296.
42. County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1976).
[Vol. 17
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The Bryson court found in MERA fundamental environmental
rights which cannot be "taken" by the state or local government.
Conduct that materially adversely affects protectable resources is
permitted only where factors of "unusual or extraordinary signifi-
cance" exist.
43
On its face, MERA appears to have succeeded in removing the
common law obstacles to effective citizen participation in the protec-
tion of the environment. However, examination of MERA's unique
provisions, in light of the cases to which it has been applied, shows
there is room for improvement.
II. MERA's UNIQUE PROVISIONS: SELECTED APPLICATIONS
MERA contains a number of unique provisions not contemplated
in Sax's Model Act.44 Provisions unique to MERA include the "limi-
tation of the hardship" doctrine, providing that "[e]conomic consid-
erations alone" may not constitute an affirmative defense;4 5 the
preclusion of actions against a landowner for conduct on his land
which is not expected to pollute, impair, or destroy air, water, land,
or other natural resources located within the state;46 and the classifi-
cation of scenic and aesthetic resources as protectable natural re-
sources "when owned by any governmental unit or agency."4
7
The inclusion of the "limitation of the economic hardship" doc-
trine resulted from sharp disagreement among the drafters of MERA
over what should constitute a defense under MERA. Under Sax's
Model Act, the defendant can justify conduct damaging to the envi-
ronment by showing there is no feasible and prudent alternative to
such conduct.48 Some of MERA's drafters were concerned that such
a provision would allow the consideration of cost as a defense. Some
drafters believed economic considerations should never be a factor
in a defense to a MERA action, while others believed it should always
be considered.49 As a compromise, the final draft of MERA included
the "no feasible and prudent alternative" language and the proviso
that "[elconomic considerations alone shall not constitute a
defense."50
43. Id.
44. See appendix to DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 247-52 (text
of Model Act).
45. MINN. STAT. § 116B.04, subd. 1 (1990) (Burden of Proof).
46. See id. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (Civil Actions).
47. Id. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (Definitions).
48. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1203, subd. 1, 691.1205, subd. 2 (1987);
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 11, at 250.
49. See Note, supra note 21, at 579.
50. Id. The language originally agreed upon by the drafters was: "Economic
considerations alone shall not justify such conduct, program or product." This was
19911
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To date, no Minnesota case initiated under MERA has focused
more than incidentally on the economic hardship limitation. How-
ever, one case sheds some light on the limitations of the "economic
considerations" provision. Powderly v. Erickson 51 involved the MERA
provision which protects buildings, structures or sites "possessing
historical, archeological, or architectural value." 52 In Powderly, citi-
zens brought an action under MERA to enjoin the demolition of row
houses which had been designated by the Minnesota Historical Soci-
ety as "historic" resources within the meaning of MERA.53 The
owner of the buildings planned to demolish them to make room for
parking for an adjacent business.54 The Minnesota Supreme Court,
on first hearing, determined that the owner of the row houses, by
raising the affirmative defense that there was no feasible and prudent
alternative to demolition, had failed to rebut plaintiffs' prima facie
evidence. The court further determined that an injunction of such
demolition did not constitute an unconstitutional taking because it
did not deprive the owner of all effective uses of the property. Dem-
olition of the row houses was therefore temporarily enjoined.55
The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether
the injunction should remain if the row houses were not sold or
renovated or if they fell into further disrepair.56 On remand, the dis-
trict court modified the injunction and determined that if the owner
could demonstrate by competent evidence that a reasonable time
had lapsed and that the row houses had not been sold, renovated or
acquired by eminent domain, demolition would be allowed.57 On
rehearing, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the district court's
modified injunction.58 The supreme court held that it had the duty
to enjoin destruction of the protected historical resources until par-
ties interested in preserving them had a reasonable opportunity to
amended to read: "Economic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct."
Id. at 579 n.26.
51. 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979), appeal after remand, 301 N.W.2d 324 (Minn.
1981).
52. Id. at 88. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1990) (Definitions).
53. Powderly, 285 N.W.2d at 88. Russell Fridley, Director of the Minnesota His-
torical Society, defined a "historical resource as a building, structure, or site possess-
ing historical, archeological, or architectural value . . . . [A]lthough atge was one
factor to consider, not all old buildings were historically significant." Id. Other fac-
tors considered were: "(1) who built the structure; (2) who lived in it; (3) its loca-
tion; (4) its architecture; (5) unique materials; (6) quality of workmanship; (7) the
structure's association with builders or important people or events in the area; and
(8) its interaction with other buildings." Id.
54. Id. at 84.
55. Id. at 89-90.
56. Powderly v. Erickson, 301 N.W.2d 324 (Minn. 1981).
57. Id. at 325.
58. Id. at 326-27.
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protect the integrity of the resources through legislation or other eq-
uitable measures.5 9 However, in the absence of such measures,
"where neither the owners nor any public body after a reasonable
length of time in which to act has lapsed, elect to preserve from dem-
olition structures which are historical resources, the owners have a
constitutional right to destroy the buildings or to put the property to
any other lawful use, free from the restrictions otherwise imposed by
[MERA]. ... 60
The holding in Powderly may allow economic considerations alone
to be used as a defense under certain circumstances. 6 l However,
some commentators suggest that the economic hardship limitation is
ambiguous because it opens for discussion the question of when, if
ever, economic considerations are truly "alone." 6 2 "Are such issues
as jobs, prices, and taxes simply 'economic' or are they partly
'social'?" 6 3
Another unique MERA provision precludes a cause of action
based on conduct taken by a person on his own land or on land
leased by him, if the conduct does not and cannot "reasonably be
expected to pollute, impair or destroy any other air, water, land, or
other natural resources located within the state ... ."64 This provi-
sion was added to MERA to limit the impact of the statute on pri-
vately-owned property, to help preserve a landowner's individual
freedom to use her property.6 5 However, it is difficult to imagine
59. Id. at 324.
60. Id.
61. In Powderly, the court could not force the owner of the historic row houses or
any one else to repair and maintain their integrity. For this reason, the result was
actually based on economic consideration.
62. See, e.g., Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 175. The question is
whether the intent of MERA to ignore economic considerations can be bypassed by
addressing important "social" considerations, such as a person's or a community's
livelihood.
63. Id. at 175 n.89. It is not difficult to identify scenarios where an activity other-
wise damaging to the environment could be justified on grounds that the activity
could benefit local economies. Opponents of MERA could argue that such benefits
are "social" rather than "economic."
64. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (1990) (Civil Actions) states:
[N]o action shall be allowable hereunder for acts taken by a person on
land leased or owned by said person pursuant to a permit or license issued
by the owner of the land to said person which do not and cannot reasonably
be expected to pollute, impair, or destroy any other air, water, land, or other
natural resources located within the state ....
Id.
65. Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4, at 175-76; Note, supra note 21, at
581-82 (based in large part on conversations with the lawmakers who were instru-
mental in getting MERA signed into law).
Prior to 1973, the Minnesota Legislature did not make audio recordings of com-
mittee or floor discussions. Therefore, all discussion regarding the intent of the leg-
islature in adopting MERA is based on secondary sources.
1991]
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any controversial conduct on a parcel of land that would not, to
some extent, affect environmental resources located beyond that
parcel of land.
In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod and Gun
Club,66 the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (MPIRG), ini-
tiated an action under MERA for declaratory and injunctive relief
against operation of a trap-and-skeet-shooting facility near the city of
Hugo in Washington County. 67 The White Bear Rod and Gun Club
(Club) had applied for and received a conditional use permit for the
operation of the Club.68 The permit required, among other things,
that noise created by the Club's activities not exceed forty decibels.69
MPIRG argued that the Club had not complied with the noise re-
quirement and that the noise from the operation of the skeet-shoot
impaired the quietude of the environment near the Club. MPIRG
further argued that pollution and destruction of water and wildlife
had occurred and would continue to occur as a result of heavy de-
posits of lead shot created by the Club's activities.70
The Club asserted its economic right, in light of the conditional
use permit, to use the land in any manner which did not "substan-
tially" affect the environment.71 The court refused to read the word
"substantial" into the statute,72 finding that the city did not have the
authority to license activity which resulted in the pollution of the en-
vironment.73 The trial court concluded that, "as against the damage
likely to be caused to the protectable natural resources[,] . . . [t]he
benefits of the Club are temporary." The purpose of MERA is to
preserve the environment for future generations. 74
White Bear Rod and Gun Club involved a common law nuisance issue
that was litigated under environmental rights legislation. It also
presented a heated discussion of the standards which should be ap-
plied in such cases. The court held that the lack of clearly developed
standards for impulsive sounds did not prevent the plaintiff from as-
serting an action under MERA for the impairment of quietude.75 In
formulating its reasoning for this holding, the court looked to the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Mason County Drain
66. 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977).
67. Id. at 764.
68. Id. at 765.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 770.
71. Id. at 771. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (1990) (Civil Actions) provides
that "no action shall be allowable under this section for conduct taken by a person
pursuant to any... license. .... "
72. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d at 782 n.1 1.
73. Id. at 783.
74. Id. at 782; see MINN. STAT. § 116B.01 (1990) (Purpose).
75. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d at 782.
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Commissioner.76 In Ray, the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the
discretion given by the Michigan Legislature to the courts to deter-
mine environmental rights in the absence of established standards.
The court stated:
The Legislature in establishing environmental rights set the pa-
rameters for the standard of environmental quality but did not at-
tempt to set forth an elaborate scheme of detailed provisions
designed to cover every conceivable type of environmental pollu-
tion or impairment. Rather the Legislature spoke as precisely as
the subject matter permits and in its wisdom left to the courts the
important task of giving substance to the standard by developing a
common law of environmental quality. The [Michigan Environ-
mental Protection] Act allows the courts to fashion standards in the
context of actual problems as they arise in individual cases .. .77
The court in White Bear Rod and Gun Club adopted the notion that
the legislature had delegated to the courts the authority to use
MERA to develop "a common law of environmental quality."78
However, in the process of developing a "common law," the court
has thus far failed to articulate adequate guidelines for evaluating
similar pollution cases in the future. This inadequacy was acknowl-
edged by Justice Todd in his dissenting opinion in White Bear Rod and
Gun Club. Justice Todd wrote: "Under the majority opinion, the de-
cision whether certain conduct amounts to noise pollution must be
made by the court with reference to vagaries attendant to the words
'materially adversely affects.' "79 The dissent contended that, with-
out standards more specific than those set out by the court, there is
no objective criteria for evaluating noise pollution. The dissent sug-
gested that, in future cases involving noise pollution, the plaintiff
should be required to introduce evidence of a maximum, objective
level of sound which is reasonable for a particular area and to show
that the conduct in question exceeds the established level.80
Perhaps the most unique provision in MERA is its scenic and aes-
thetic provision. Minnesota contains millions of acres of wilderness
in its state and federal parks and forests. By providing for the pro-
tection of scenic and aesthetic resources, the drafters of MERA
sought to preserve Minnesota's natural beauty. Exactly how the
drafters of MERA intended this provision to be enforced is not clear.
MERA states that "[s]cenic and aesthetic resources shall . . . be
considered natural resources when owned by any governmental unit
76. Id. at 782 n.12; Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm., 393 Mich. 294, 224
N.W.2d 883 (1975).
77. Ray, 393 Mich. at 306, 224 N.W.2d at 888 (footnotes omitted).
78. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d at 762 n.12 (quoting Ray, 393 Mich.
at 306, 224 N.W.2d at 888).
79. Id. at 786 (Todd, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
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or agency."81 Arguably, the phrase, "when owned by any govern-
mental unit or agency," is ambiguous. Does it mean that the scenic
or aesthetic resource must be owned by the state if it is to be pro-
tected, or that conduct is actionable only if it is likely to adversely
affect a state-owned scenic or aesthetic resource?
However, the difficulty of defining objective criteria for determin-
ing what constitutes a scenic or aesthetic resource is a more serious
problem.82 This provision may have been left ambiguous for fear
that a more specific provision would result in less effective protection
of the environment.83 A more likely explanation for the ambiguity is
that the legislature intended to delegate to the courts the task of de-
veloping the law of environmental quality.84
III. THE MARTZ DECISION
In State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz,8 5 Martz was enjoined under MERA
from building a radio tower on land he owned near the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) in Cook County, Minnesota. Construc-
tion of the 611-foot tower was challenged by Drabik and other Cook
County residents on several grounds: (1) the tower would infringe
on the scenic and aesthetic beauty of the BWCA and surrounding
81. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1990) (Definitions).
82. See Linder, New Direction for Preservation Law: Creating an Environment Worth Ex-
periencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49 (1990) [hereinafter Linder, New Direction]. "The conclu-
sion that a particular place or object is 'beautiful' or 'ugly' has little to do with the
tenets of any school of aesthetic formalism. Beauty, it appears, is indeed in the eye of
the beholder." Id. at 52.
Linder further states:
Visual beauty is an inappropriate basis for preserving natural areas. Re-
liance on visual beauty as the basis for protection only obscures the underly-
ing value conflict. Various natural configurations are not favored because
they have qualities that could be identified by aesthetic experts. Patterns of
aesthetic responses indicate that "aesthetic response is a social construct,
not an ontological given." How "beautiful" or "ugly" a place is said to be
depends on how people construe the place's message, not upon formal vis-
ual properties.
Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted).
83. See, e.g., Houston Compressed Steel Corp. v. Texas, 456 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970). In upholding a Texas air pollution statute, the court responded to
allegations that the statute's definition of air pollution was unconstitutionally vague
by stating: "The science of air pollution control is new and inexact, and these stan-
dards are difficult to devise, but if they are to be effective, they must be broad. If they
are too precise they will provide easy escape for those who wish to circumvent the
law." Id. at 774.
84. See, e.g., White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d at 782 n.12 (citing Ray, 393
Mich. at 306, 224 N.W.2d at 888) (In establishing environmental rights, the legisla-
ture set the parameters for a standard of environmental quality which was to be de-
veloped in detail by the courts.).
85. 451 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, Apr. 25, 1990.
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wilderness areas,8 6 (2) the supporting guy wires for the tower would
endanger certain protected birds,87 and (3) the diesel fuel storage
tanks necessary to power the radio station and tower could leak and
threaten wildlife and water quality.8 8 Under MERA, Drabik had to
show that a protectable natural resource was at issue and that Martz's
construction and operation of the tower would likely cause pollution,
impairment, or destruction of that resource. 89
The crucial issue in the case was whether Martz could be enjoined
from building a structure on private land if the structure marred the
view from government-owned land.90 Drabik sought to protect natu-
ral resources, including the scenic view from public lands surround-
ing Martz's property, and the safety of bird and plant life on and
around Martz's property. Drabik argued that, if Martz was permitted
to build the tower, the visual impact of the tower on the surrounding
public lands would impair the wilderness setting. Drabik further ar-
gued that there was a significant chance that birds flying through
Martz's land would be injured or killed by the tower's guy wires and
that leakage of fuel used to power the radio tower would harm plant
life and water quality.9 1
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
to enjoin Martz from constructing the tower.92 The court held that
the view in and around the BWCA is a protectable natural resource
86. Id. at 896-97. "Over 95% of Cook County land is owned by government
entities and Martz' site is virtually surrounded by the BWCA, Judge C.R. Magney
State Park and other parkland areas with outdoor recreational and wilderness uses."
Id. at 895.
87. Id. at 897. Drabik argued that "bald eagles and peregrine falcons... can be
expected to fly in the vicinity of the Proposed Tower and that the Proposed Tower
would place numbers of these species at risk." Respondent's Brief at 22-23, State cc
rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (C6-89-1620).
88. DrabiA, 451 N.W.2d at 897. Drabik argued that "leakage from ... fuel stor-
age tanks during delivery, refueling and/or storage would present a fire hazard.
Leaks would endanger the area's plant and animal life and cause ground water con-
tamination. Any leakage, contamination, or fire, moreover, would likely go unno-
ticed, as the tower site will not be manned." Respondent's Brief at 20, State ex rel.
Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (C6-89-1620).
89. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 896. See also County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 297 Minn.
218, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973), rev'd, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976); MINN. STAT.
§ 116B.04 (1990) (Burden of Proof).
90. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 897.
91. Id. at 896-97.
92. The procedural history of the Martz case is relatively complex. Findings of
fact were not fully made at the trial and it is arguable whether, in fact, the tower's guy
wires posed a significant risk of injury or death to birds or whether the storage of
diesel fuel on the land posed a significant risk of harm to plant life and water quality.
Martz submitted affidavits which suggested the tower was not located in any major
avian migration route and that diesel-powered generators were common and safe to
the area. Appellant's Brief at 9-12, State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (C6-89-1620).
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within the meaning of MERA and that construction of the radio
tower would materially impact that view, diminishing the wilderness
experience for visitors to the area. 93
The state can clearly enjoin conduct which has or is likely to have
an adverse affect on traditionally protected natural resources, such as
plant and animal life.94 However, in Martz, there is the additional
question of how the scenic and aesthetic language of MERA should
be interpreted.95
Most would agree that a view without a radio tower is more aes-
thetically pleasing than a view with a radio tower, particularly when
the tower is located near wilderness areas such as the BWCA. But,
MERA protects only scenic and aesthetic natural resources "owned
by any governmental unit or agency." 96 Martz argued that his land
did not come under this provision since it was not owned by the state
or any of its agencies. 97 Martz also pointed to section 1 16B.03 of the
Minnesota Statutes, which disallows actions under MERA "for acts
taken by a person on land leased or owned by said person.., which
do not and can not reasonably be expected to pollute, impair, or
destroy any other air, water, land or other natural resources located
within the state."98
Martz argued that this language prevented the state from regulat-
ing conduct on his land, so long as the conduct did not unreasonably
affect other natural resources.99 He stated that the question of
whether or not the tower was a scenic eyesore was irrelevant since
the state did not own a proprietary interest in Martz's land.100 Fur-
ther, Amicus Cook County argued that MERA clearly distinguishes
traditional natural resources from scenic and aesthetic resources be-
cause traditional resources are readily quantifiable while scenic and
93. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 897.
94. Id. at 896. But see MINN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 2 (1990) (Definitions) (ex-
empting family farms, a family farm corporation, or bona fide farmer corporations)
and MINN STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 5 (1990) (providing that "'pollution, impairment
or destruction' shall not include conduct which violates, or is likely to violate, any...
standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement or permit solely be-
cause of the introduction of an odor into the air").
In County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1976), the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted the family farm exemption to mean that "the only con-
duct by a landowner which is immune from suit under the Act is farming or farm-
related activity." Id. at 320.
95. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 896-97.
96. MINN. STAT. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1990).
97. Drabik, 451 NW.2d at 897.
98. MINN. STAT. § 116B.03, subd. 1 (1990).
99. Commentators suggest this provision is designed to allow land owners free-
dom to do as they wish with their land. See Bryden, Environmental Rights, supra note 4,
at 175-76.
100. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 897.
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aesthetic resources are not. Amicus Cook County stated: "Scientists
can measure air quality, constituents in land or water, amounts of
timber, and even decibels polluting quietude. Scenic [and aesthetic]
resources . . . are very subjective; beauty is in the eye of the
beholder."101
Martz contended that MERA's scenic and aesthetic provision was
overly subjective and that no court could reasonably interpret the
provision to include the actions of private landowners on their own
land. Though this argument seems logical, the court of appeals
found it flawed. Drabik framed the sole issue of the case as
"[w]hether MERA protects the scenic and aesthetic qualities of gov-
ernment-owned wilderness from visual despoliation."102 The court
found that MERA protected such qualities, stating: "The question is
not whether the view from government owned land onto private
property is protected. The issue is whether protected scenic and aes-
thetic resources of the government owned land would be materially
adversely affected by construction of the tower."103 The court held
that conduct on private land may be enjoined if the conduct ad-
versely affects the scenic or aesthetic value of government-owned
lands. 104
The Martz holding presents potential problems for future environ-
mental disputes where scenic and aesthetic values are at issue. With-
out a concrete standard for the evaluation of scenic and aesthetic
resource violations, landowners and Minnesota courts will have diffi-
culty determining what conduct constitutes a violation of this provi-
sion. Given the results in cases such as Powderly v. Erickson,105 it is
not difficult to imagine a set of facts which could circumvent both the
economic considerations and the scenic and aesthetic provision and
allow degradation of Minnesota's environment.106 Like the court in
101. Brief for Amicus Curiae Cook County at 5, State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451
N.W.2d 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (No. C6-89-1620). Cook County provided Martz
with the necessary permits for construction of the tower. It was Cook County's posi-
tion that a broad interpretation of the scenic and aesthetic provision could have an
overreaching impact on the County and on other parts of northern Minnesota where
most of the land is owned by government entities. Cook County argued that the
increased government ownership rights which would result from a broad interpreta-
tion of the scenic and aesthetic provision would have a chilling effect on the desirabil-
ity of private property ownership in such areas. Id. at 7.
102. Respondent's Brief at 12, State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (No. C6-89-1620).
103. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 897.
104. Id.
105. 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979), appeal after remand, 301 N.W.2d 324 (Minn.
1981).
106. For the sake of argument, consider this: A small town in Minnesota is exper-
iencing hard times. Its core industries are no longer important to Minnesota's econ-
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White Bear Rod and Gun Club,to7 the Martz court failed to establish
adequate guidelines for future evaluation of unique natural re-
sources, such as those with scenic and aesthetic value.
IV. A SUGGESTED METHOD FOR EVALUATION
A. The Judicial Approach to Scenic and Aesthetic Disputes
Courts in some jurisdictions have refused to consider environmen-
tal disputes based solely or largely on scenic or aesthetic grounds.
Generally, these courts point to the lack of objective criteria available
in defining scenic and aesthetic value as the reason for avoiding such
an evaluation.i0 8 In Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc. ,109 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sought to enjoin
the defendant from constructing an observation tower near the site
of the Battle of Gettysburg. The court stated:
It is difficult to conceive of any human activity that does not in
some degree impair the natural, scenic and aesthetic values of any
environment. If the standard of injury to historic values is to be
that expressed by the Commonwealth's witnesses as an "intrusion"
or "distraction," it becomes difficult to imagine any activity in the
vicinity of Gettysburg which would not unconstitutionally harm its
historic values. This, of course, indicates why elements of State
government other than the judiciary should . . . establish reason-
omy. The town's population is shrinking as it loses residents to metropolitan areas
with better employment opportunities. The town faces extinction.
An ambitious developer comes up with the idea of building a theme park/mega
mall to revive the town. The mega mall will attract hundreds of thousands of tourists
each year and will provide jobs for virtually all the unemployed residents of the area.
The mall will also turn several thousand acres of wilderness into parking lots, build-
ings, and amusement park rides.
A citizen environmental protection group initiates a suit to block the planned
mega mall, asserting its right to protect the environment. The group argues that the
mall will not only destroy protected wilderness, but that it will ruin the scenic and
aesthetic experience of visiting the area.
The court allows construction of the mall, holding that the consideration of eco-
nomics is proper when a community's survival and jobs are at stake. Further, the
court holds that, because there are no objective standards for determining what is
scenically or aesthetically protectable and because the mall will replace only a few
thousand acres of forest, construction cannot be blocked.
107. 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn. 1977).
108. See, e.g., City of Portage v. Kalamazoo County Rd. Comm'n, 136 Mich. App.
276, 355 N.W.2d 913 (1984) (Aesthetic considerations alone will not allow judicial
intervention under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.); Commonwealth v.
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886
(1973), aff'don appeal, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973) (Aesthetic or historical con-
siderations by themselves are not sufficient to constitute a basis for the Common-
wealth's exercise of its police power.).
109. 8 Pa. Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886, aff'don appeal, 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588
(1973).
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able regulations for the preservation, conservation and mainte-
nance of the peoples' resources. I1 0
Other courts, however, routinely endorse the use of the concept of
visual beauty in land-use and preservation cases."'t The United
States Supreme Court has held that visual beauty is a legitimate crite-
ria for land regulation.' 12 Critics of this endorsement, like Martz,
contend that statutes with undefined procedures for the evaluation
of what is scenically or aesthetically pleasing eventually become
"catch all remedies" for anyone opposing development.1s Yet, ju-
dicial definition of scenic and aesthetic standards is arguably less in-
trusive when natural resource preservation is at issue than when such
standards are used to prevent "private development considered to
be in bad taste."' "1
4
The problem arises when a private landowner is surrounded by
protectable public lands. Nearly all of Cook County is government-
owned wilderness.115 Virtually anything a private landowner does in
such a setting may be considered a despoliation of the environment.
For this reason, it would be prudent to establish evaluation criteria
that puts similarly situated landowners on notice as to what they may
and may not do with their land.
The Michigan courts have developed a common law of environ-
mental quality. Michigan courts employ a four-part test in conjunc-
tion with the Michigan Environmental Protection Act to determine
whether the impact of a proposed action on the environment rises to
a level that justifies judicial intervention. In City of Portage v.
Kalamazoo County Road Commission,116 the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered the removal of dozens of trees along a city street that was
to be widened. In deciding whether to allow the removal of the
trees, the court considered:
(1) whether the natural resource involved [was] rare, unique, en-
dangered, or ha[d] historical significance, (2) whether the resource
[was] easily replaceable, (for example, by replanting trees or
restocking fish), (3) whether the proposed action [would] have any
110. Id. at 249, 302 A.2d at 895.
111. See Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas,
80 MICH. L. REv. 355 (1982) (examining the judicial trend toward placing strong
emphasis on aesthetics).
112. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981)
(regulation of signs and billboards); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 n.1
(1980) (zoning of open space); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (designation of historic landmark).
113. Appellant's Brief at 19, State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (No. C6-89-1620).
114. Linder, New Direction, supra note 82, at 51.
115. Drabik, 451 N.W.2d at 895.
116. 136 Mich. App. 276, 355 N.W.2d 913 (1984).
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significant consequential effect on other natural resources (for ex-
ample, whether wildlife [would] be lost if its habitat [were to be]
impaired or destroyed), and (4) whether the direct or consequent-
ial impact on animals or vegetation [would] affect a critical number,
considering the nature and location of the wildlife affected." 17
The Michigan court determined that the short-term effect of remov-
ing trees, even when considered in aesthetic terms, did not merit ju-
dicial intervention. Further, the court held that the trees were not
unique, endangered or of historical significance and that there was
no significant direct impact on other natural resources.'
1 8
The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the same four-part test to
a case with facts similar to those of City of Portage one day after it
decided the Martz case. In Kasden v. Independent School District No.
97,119 the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the removal of
trees for construction of a driveway. The plaintiff in Kasden argued
that removal of the trees would impair the scenic and aesthetic qual-
ity of the grove in which the trees were located, and would destroy
the quietude the trees provided by shielding noise from a school
playground. 1 2 0
Applying the City of Portage test to Kasden, the court of appeals ac-
knowledged the similarities between MERA and the Michigan Envi-
ronmental Protection Act and noted that Minnesota courts have
looked to Michigan law in the past to help interpret MERA.121 The
Kasden court then determined that the grove in question was not
"unique" in terms of aesthetic or historical significance. From a sil-
vicultural standpoint, the number of trees to be removed was too
small to be significant. Further, the removal of the trees would not
have a significant impact on the aesthetic value of the remaining
grove. Finally, the removal of the trees would not have a material
adverse impact on the environment.1
22
A key problem with the test used in City of Portage and in Kasden is
that such a test does not provide for an evaluation of scenic or aes-
thetic resources as they stand alone. The test fails to articulate defin-
itive standards for determining what is a protectable scenic or
aesthetic resource.
Applying the City of Portage test to Martz, the court of appeals could
117. Id. at 279, 355 N.W.2d at 916.
118. Id.
119. Kasden v. Independent School District No. 97, No. C7-88-1597 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 28, 1989) (1989 WL 14900). The Kasden case, an unpublished opinion,
was decided by the three-judge panel of Kalitowski, Lansing and Fleming, none of
whom sat on the Martz panel.
120. Id. at 1.
121. Id. at 2. See, e.g., People for Envtl. Enlightenment & Responsibility (PEER),
Inc. v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858, 866 (Minn. 1978).
122. Kasden, No. C7-88-1597, at 3.
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have determined that the scenic and aesthetic qualities of Cook
County and the BWCA are unique and of historical significance to
the state of Minnesota. Arguably, such qualities are not easily re-
placed. The construction of the tower could affect other natural re-
sources, such as bird, plant and other animal life. In light of the
state's interests in protecting these resources, the impact of the
tower on the scenic and aesthetic qualities of the area could be too
great to justify construction of the tower.
Likewise, the court could have arrived at an opposite result. The
court could have determined that, given the vast expanse of the
BWCA and other wilderness areas surrounding Martz's property, the
limited view from these areas onto the Martz property was so insig-
nificant that it could not be classified as unique or endangered. In
light of this insignificance, the resource at issue could be considered
to be not in danger. The court could have concluded that construc-
tion of the radio tower would pose no significant threat to other nat-
ural resources.
B. Scenic and Aesthetic Criteria in Zoning Law
The use of zoning ordinances to preserve unique scenic and aes-
thetic resources has become an accepted practice.123 Local govern-
ments have the police power to enact zoning ordinances which
protect scenic and aesthetic resources. Generally, zoning ordinances
are upheld if the local government merely shows that a rational con-
nection exists between the public welfare and the scope of the ordi-
nance and that the ordinance does not inflict irreparable injury on an
individual landowner.124 A variety of zoning ordinances that protect
scenic and aesthetic resources have been upheld.125 Previously,
123. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 257, 261 (1980) (upholding
zoning ordinance providing for density restrictions to limit the development of urban
land); County of Pine v. Department of Natural Resources, 280 N.W.2d 625, 629-30
(Minn. 1979) (holding ordinance restricting uses of property that would cause harm
to major river corridor to be a valid exercise of police power to preserve aesthetic
and economic benefits of river corridor); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village
of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1968) (using aesthetic consid-
erations as factors in determining whether to uphold a zoning ordinance). But see
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528-30 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (striking down ordinance banning billboard.).
124. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
125. Id. at 261 n.7. (upholding ordinance protecting the preservation of open
space "for the assurance of the continued availability of land for the production of
food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recreation and for the use of
natural resources"); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110
(1978) (upholding ordinance which prevented the construction of a skyscraper on
top of a historic building on grounds that the skyscraper would degrade the visual
and historic value of the existing historic building); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33
(1954) (reasoning that if city decides the community should be beautiful, the Fifth
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courts were reluctant to uphold ordinances based solely on scenic or
aesthetic considerations, reasoning that such considerations alone
could not be sufficient to justify the use of the police power. There-
fore, local governments have used other justifications, such as traffic
safety, to sustain ordinances where their true motivation was the pro-
tection of aesthetic value.126
Today, scenic and aesthetic considerations alone justify the use of
the police power. 127 The rationale is that "unsightly utilization of
land can have adverse affects on people or on property values that
are just as real and troublesome as those created by smoke, odors or
other common nuisances that lower the quality of the environ-
ment."128 So long as the government can show that a rational con-
nection exists between the ordinance and the public welfare and that
the landowner has incurred no irreparable harm, the ordinance will
be upheld.129
C. Suggested Method for Evaluation
The first step in evaluating the protection of scenic and aesthetic
resources should be the identification of what is scenically or aes-
thetically protectable. Arguably, objectively identifying what is
"scenic" or "aesthetic" based on visual beauty is impossible because
"beauty" is entirely subjective. Minnesota courts could avoid attacks
on MERA's "scenic and aesthetic" provision based on vagueness if
the "visual beauty" rationale is abandoned.0o Instead, courts
should determine whether the resource has sufficient community
Amendment cannot stand in the way); County of Pine, 280 N.W.2d at 627 (upholding
ordinance with dominant aesthetic purpose which prevented the construction of a
residence near river bank); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 281 Minn. at 499, 162
N.W.2d at 212 (upholding ordinance based largely on aesthetic considerations which
phased-out the operation of billboards within the city).
126. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 529 n.7. The Metromedia case concerned a San Diego
city ordinance banning the use of billboard advertisements under certain circum-
stances. The city in Metromedia claimed as justification for the ordinance that exces-
sive posting of billboards within the city limits had a detrimental impact on highway
traffic safety. Id. Damages to scenic and aesthetic resources are often alleged to-
gether with damages to tangible natural resources because of the fear that scenic and
aesthetic damage alone will not be enough to justify judicial intervention.
127. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 529 n.7.
128. Ziegler, Ohio Land Use Law, supra note 8, at 2. See also Allison v. Smith, 695
P.2d 791, 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
129. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
130. There is little evidence to support the visual beauty rationale of preventing
"eyesores" or "offensive visual forms" based on the physiological or sensory predis-
position of human beings to experience visual qualities in a relatively uniform man-
ner. Aesthetic response to visual form appears to be largely based on the meanings
ascribed to it by the cultural contexts of our individual histories and our experiences
as members of political, economic, religious, and other societal groups. Ziegler, Ohio
Land Use Law, supra note 8, at 26.
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support and appreciation to merit protection from nearby activity
that is substantially and realisticallyl1t out of harmony with the re-
source's visual character.
The next step in evaluating the protection of scenic and aesthetic
resources should be to balance any private interests in question
against the public interest in protecting the scenic or aesthetic re-
source. Scenic and aesthetic criteria under zoning law calls for a bal-
ancing of private and public interests. This balancing test is absent
from environmental protection statutes such as MERA. Minnesota
courts should borrow this balancing test from zoning law to block
action on land which harms a scenic or aesthetic resource. Minne-
sota courts should also use a standard which looks to whether the
proposed action presents a substantial and realistic threat to the
scenic or aesthetic resource to be protected rather than the over-
broad relationship-to-the-public-welfare standard.ts2 Courts could
then balance the support for the resource against the harm done to
any private interests in question.
In a case with facts similar to those in Martz, this method for evalu-
ation would first look to whether widespread appreciation and sup-
port existed in the community for protecting the area from the scenic
and aesthetic impact of a 611-foot tower. Second, the test would ex-
amine whether the tower would present a substantial and realistic
threat to the scenic and aesthetic views from the BWCA. Next, the
test would balance this finding against the potential harm done to
the private landowner if construction of the tower is prohibited. The
balancing of these issues would be left to the fact finder.133
131. The language "substantial and realistic threat" is taken from Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 474 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued for a "centrality"
test instead of a "coercion" test for cases involving the constitutional issue of free
exercise of religion. Id. In Lyng, the issue was whether the government could be
enjoined from building a road through part of a national forest in Northern Califor-
nia which was the site of the "high country," an area which played and continues to
play a critical role in the religious practices and rituals of certain Native American
tribes. Id. at 442. The Native American tribes argued that construction of the road
would disrupt their ritual practices to the point of preventing them from practicing
their religion. The majority held in favor of the government on the ground that the
act of building the road did not "coerce" the Native American tribes to practice an-
other religion or, in fact, prevent them from practicing their own religion. Id. at 449.
Justice Brennan argued that if the Court employed his "centrality" test, the Court
must find that the site of the road so substantially and realistically threatened the
practice of the Native American faith that the Court would be required to prohibit
construction of the road. Id. at 475.
132. Most would concede that protection of the environment is rationally related
to the advancement of the public welfare. For this reason, it is necessary to use a
standard which is customized for environmental disputes.
133. No matter what balancing test is employed, either the environment or the
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CONCLUSION
Although the result of the Martz decision may not have been differ-
ent with the application of a more definitive standard for the evalua-
tion of scenic and aesthetic resources, the present decision's
precedential value is questionable since it relies on the vagaries of
the words "materially adversely affects."134 Minnesota courts should
take advantage of the opportunity presented by cases like Martz to
develop more definite standards for the evaluation of unique envi-
ronmental issues, such as those raised by MERA's scenic and aes-
thetic provision.
Timothy S. Murphy
actor will pay some price. John McPhee describes this balancing process particularly
well:
When Stanley dammed the river, and diverted it into the pipe, he took it
out of its bed for a couple of hundred yards. Pools remained there, like low
tide, and as they slowly drained they revealed the graylings' dorsal fins. I
walked from pool to pool, trapping the fish with my hands. This pretty little
stream is being disassembled in the name of gold. The result of the summer
season-of moving forty thousand cubic yards of material through a box, of
scraping off the tundra and stuffing it up a hill, of making a muck-and-gravel
hash out of what are now streamside meadows of bluebells and lupine, dai-
sies and Arctic forget-me-nots, yellow poppies, and saxifrage-will be a pea-
nut-butter jar filled with flaky gold. Probably no one will actually use it.
Investors will draw it into their world and lock it in an armored cellar, while
up here in these untravelled mountains a machine-made moonscape will tell
the tale. Am I disgusted? Manifestly not. Not from here, from now, from
this perspective. I am too warmly, too subjectively caught up in what the
Gelvins are doing. In the ecomilitia, bust me to private. This mine is a cork
on the sea. Meanwhile (and, possibly, more seriously), the relationship be-
tween this father and son is as attractive as anything I have seen in Alaska-
both of them self-reliant beyond the usual reach of the term, the characteris-
tic formed by this country. Whatever they are doing, whether it is mining or
something else, they do for themselves what no one else is here to do for
them. Their kind is more endangered every year. Balance that against the
nick they are making in this land. Only an easygoing extremist would pre-
serve every bit of the country. And extremists alone would exploit it all.
Everyone else has to think the matter through-choose a point of tolerance,
however much the point might tend to one side. For myself, I am closer to
the preserving side-that is, the side that would preserve the Gelvins. To be
sure, I would preserve plenty of land as well. My own margin of tolerance
would not include some faceless corporation "responsible" to a hundred
thousand stockholders, making a crater you could see from the moon. Nor
would it include visiting exploiters-here in the seventies, gone in the eight-
ies-with some pipe and some skyscrapers left behind.
J. MCPHEE, COMING INTO THE COUNTRY (1977), quoted in Linder, New Direction, supra
note 82, at 72-73.
134. State ex rel. Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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